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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JUDITH H. DIENES and
DIANNE D. McMAIN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
Case No.
SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE
.
11048
~
COMPANY, a Washington
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE
WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY IN UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE.

The Court's opinion observes that "Plaintiffs'
request for an instruction on their theory of the
case was refused." The decision does not specify
which of the Plaintiffs' requested instructions, 16,
17, 18 or 19 is referred to. Defendant does not deny
that Plantiffs were entitled to have their theory of
the case presented to the jury, but the Court was
not required to submit it in the language of the requested instructions. It is sufficient that all the in3

structions when considered together, cover the issues
and the applicable principles of law in such a way
that the jury will understand them. Macshara vs.
Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756, Ostertag
vs. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022. The
Plaintiffs' right to recover was succinctly stated in
the Court's Instruction No. 15 which reads as follows:
"In order to prove the essential elements
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence
in the case the following proposition: That the
death of Lewis Dienes was a result of bodily
injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means."
The Court's opinion states that because the instruction was in the policy language, the jury was
permitted to determine the legal effect of the words
of the policy. The Court said that the language of
the policy means " ... that Plaintiffs may recover
if the insured died as a result of injuries sustained
solely by external, violent and accidental means".
The Court's interpretive language, '' . . . result of
injuries sustained solely by external, violent and
accident mean," does not differ from the policy
language in any m a t e r i a 1 respect. The phrase
"bodily injuries" appears in the policy and is even
more explicit than the term "injuries" used by the
Court. The Court chose to substitute "sustained" for
the policy term "effected". Either word clearly conveys the idea that before liability would arise, the
4

injuries had to result solely through "external, violent and accidental means." The Court also substituted the term "by" for the policy 1 an g u age
"through".
It is submitted that the trial court's Instruction
No. 15 did, in fact, present the Plaintiffs' theory
of recovery in essentially the very language suggested in the Court's opinion. The variance is in choice
of words and not in the substance of the idea being
expressed. Surely the jury was as capable of understanding the instruction as given as the language
contained in the Court's decision.

Although the decision discusses rules which
apply in construing ambiguous insurance contracts,
the reasoning and very language of the Court negates any such ambiguity in the instruction of the
Trial Court concerning it. The reasoning and language of the Court's decision should be considered
an affirmance of the Trial Court's instruction rather than a basis for finding it ambiguous.
POINT II
THE COURT IN RENDERING ITS OPINION
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT
EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT I'T.

There was a sharp dispute at trial in the medical testimony concerning the cause of death. Dr.
Smith was of the opinion that the automobile accident was a contributing factor to the final heart
attack ( R. 86). Pathologist Carlquist made no at5

tempt to relate the accident to the heart attack.
Heart specialist Dr. George Curtis, was of the opinion that the accident had no connection with Mr.
DiEnes' death ( R. 123, 125). The Court, in the
recent language of Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 436 P.2d
442, 20 Utah 2d 210, ( 1968), has the " ... duty to
assume that the jury believed the evidence which
supports (the jury) verdict and ... to review the
evidence whatever inference can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to it." Additionally, the verdict carries with it a
"presumption of validity." Brereton vs. Dixon, 443
P.2d 3, 20 Utah 2d 64 (1967). The compelling conclusion in the present case is that the jury believed
the testimony of Dr. Curtis and found as a fact that
DiEnes' death was not related to the accident. Any
other conclusion does violence to the verdict returned by the jury in this case and denies it the effect
this Court has repeatedly held it to be entitled.
These presumptions make the general verdict very
clear and it should not be stricken down for vagueness. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion states:
"From the general verdict rendered by
the jury, it is not possible for us to know
whether the jury found as a fact that death
was caused by a heart attack independent of
injuries received in the accident or whether
death resulted from a heart attack induced by
such injuries and which otherwise would not
have occurred at that time."
This Court has recently reaffirmed the tradi6

tional role of an appellant tribunal in the following
words:
"In view of the contentions made to upset this judgment, it seems necessary to restate and emphasize that upon appeal it is our
duty to assume that the jury believed the evidence which supports their verdict; and for
that reason, to review the evidence of whatever inferences can fairly and reasonably be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to it." Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 436 P.2d, 442,
443, 20 Utah 2d 210, (1968). See also Brereton vs. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 443 P.2d 3,
(1967).
Additionally, the policy itself specifically excludes recovery under the policy for death caused
by disease.
Although the Court could have required the
jury to return a special verdict or to answer special
interrogatories in connection with the general verdict, none were requested by counsel. There is an
inference in the Court's opinion that this procedure
should have been followed in this case. However,
that determination is properly left to the discretion
of the trial judge (Rule 49 U.R.C.P.). Uncertainty
has not infrequently arisen in interpreting special
findings. See liVarner vs. United States Mutual Accident Association, 32 P. 696, 8 Utah 431; Schweitzer vs. Stone, 371 P.2d 201, 13 Utah 2d 199. The
presumptions favoring the validity of a verdict apply to a general as well as to a special verdict to
7

avoid the temptation to violate the sanctity of jury
findings.
The Court's opinion refers to the case of Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah
532, 72 P.2d 1060, for the proposition that ambiguous statements in an insurance policy are to be enforced against the insurer. This is not contested, but
the Browning decision has greater significance in
this case, because it carefully analyzes policy provisions similar to those contained in the present
policy:
"An injury effected through violent, external and accidental means, entirely independent of all other causes, have made three
distinctions or classes of cases : ( 1) When an
accident causes a diseased condition which, together with the accident, results in the injury
or death complained of, the accident alone is
to be considered as the cause of the injury or
death. (Citing cases) (2) When, at the time
of the accident, the insured was suffering
from some disease, but the disease had no
causal connection with the injury or death
resulting from the accident, the accident is to
be considered the sole cause. (Ci ting cases)
(3). \\t7hen at the time of the accident there
was an existing disease which, cooperating
with the accident, resulted in the injury or
death, the accident cannot be considered as
the sole cause, or as the cause independent of
all other causes. (Citing cases)"
8

The facts in the present case are even stronger
in favor of the jury verdict than the findings necessary to deny recovery under Browning. Mr. DiEnes
suffered from a serious heart disease before the accident which had shown symptoms of the progressive
deterioration of his entire body to the extent that
death was imminent at any time. There was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that it
was the sole cause of death.
'The opinion in the present case indicates that
under this type of policy there can be a recovery
"... when death results from injuries and would
not have occurred at that time except for those injuries." Even application of this principle in the
present case does not justify overturning the jury
verdict because there was sufficient testimony to
support the jury's finding that the injuries DiEnes
sustained in the accident had no connection with
his death. There is a presumption that the jury so
found.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff's theory of the case was submitted
to the jury in almost the identical language of the
Court's opinion. The jury was as capable of understanding the Trial Court's instruction as a new jury
would be of the language contained in the opinion.
9

Further, there was sufficient evidence, in addition
to legal presumptions, to support the jury's No
Cause for Action verdict.
Respectfully submitted
HANSON & BALDWIN
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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